Truth suffers from too much analysis

Posts Tagged ‘Clear and Distinct’

Whatever Is Conceivable Is Possible

Posted by allzermalmer on September 27, 2012

I am going to quote one little section in a book called Hume’s First Principles by Robert Fendel Anderson. This first part of the book is on Perceptions, and the first principle gone over on Perceptions is “Whatever is Conceivable is Possible”.

“The principle of the possible existence of whatever is conceivable is one which Hume finds both an evident principle and already an established maxim in metaphysics[1]. The application of the principle is frequently restricted to that which is clearly and distinctly conceivable: “…nothing of which we can form a clear and distinct idea is absurd and impossible.”[2] Again: “To form a clear idea of anything, is an undeniable argument for its possibility…”[3]. The possibility of existence, therefore, is of the essence of whatever is clearly and distinctly conceived; that is, its possibility is included or implied within it: “ ‘Tis an establish’d maxim in metaphysics, That whatever the mind clearly conceives includes the idea of possible existence…”[4] and: “Whatever can be conceiv’d by a clear and distinct idea necessarily implies the possibility of existence….”[5]

A clear and distinct idea, according to Hume’s doctrine, is one which neither contains nor implies a contradiction: “Now whatever is intelligible, and can be distinctly conceived, implies no contradiction…”[6] Again: “How any clear, and distinct idea can contain circumstances, contradictory to itself, or to any other clear, distinct idea, is absolutely incomprehensible….”[7] In saying that whatever is clearly and distinctly conceived is possible, therefore, it appears to be Hume’s intention also that whatever is self-consistent and noncontradictory is possible:

“Whatever can be conceiv’d by a clear and distinct idea necessarily implies the possibility of existence; and he who pretends to prove the impossibility of its existence by any argument deriv’d from the clear idea, in reality asserts, that we have no clear idea of it, because we have a clear idea. ‘Tis in vain to search for a contradiction in any thing that is distinctly conceiv’d by the mind.”[8]

The expression employed in the remarks thus far examined may lead the reader to suppose that there are some things clearly and distinctly conceived and some not- that some of our ideas are clear and distinct and some of them unclear and indistinct. Were this true, then it would follow that we have ideas of things the existence of which we must regard as impossible. There is evidence, however, that Hume considers all our ideas to be clear and distinct. He offers an argument to this conclusion, based on his doctrine that ideas are derived from impressions:

“…we need but reflect on that principle so oft insisted on, that all our ideas are copy’d from our impressions. For from thence we may immediately conclude, that since all impressions are clear and precise, the ideas, which are copy’d from them, must be of the same nature…”[9]

Since all perceptions are either impressions or ideas[10], we must conclude that there are no perceptions of any kind that are not clear and precise.

From the clarity and preciseness of all ideas, we may infer, moreover, that we possess no ideas of those things whose existence we must regard as impossible, but that any idea we may have is the idea of something the existence of which is possible. We find, indeed, that Hume does not always restrict the possibility of existence to that which is clearly and distinctly conceived, but extends it as well to everything that is conceived or imagined at all: “…whatever we conceive is possible.”[11] And: “…whatever we can imagine, is possible.”[12]Hume appears, indeed, to make no firm distinction between what is clearly and distinctly conceived and what is conceived or imagined merely, as is evidenced in his full statement of the metaphysical maxim: “ ‘Tis an establish’d maxim in metaphysics, That whatever the mind clearly conceives includes the idea of possible existence, or in other words, that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible.”[13] We are thus again justified, apparently, in supposing that all our ideas are equally clear and distinct, and that all things conceived are possible. Things which are contradictory and therefore impossible, on the other hand, cannot be conceived or imagined at all: “We can form the idea of a golden mountain, and from thence conclude that such a mountain may actually exist. We can form no idea of a mountain without a valley, and therefore regard it as impossible.”[14] Again: “ ‘Tis in vain to search for a contradiction in any thing that is distinctly conceiv’d by the mind. Did it imply any contradiction, ‘tis impossible it cou’d ever be coneiv’d.”[15]

Knowing then that self-contradictory things are neither conceivable nor possible, and knowing that whatever is conceived or imagined is possible, we may next inquire what things are in fact conceived or imagined and hence possible. From certain of Hume’s remarks one might infer that we conceive only perceptions; for it is only perceptions that are “present to” the mind: “…nothing is ever really present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and ideas…”[16] If this be true, then it is reasonable to suppose that we have clear and distinct ideas only of perceptions, as Hume sometimes appears to agree: “We have no perfect idea of any thing but of a perception.”[17] Now if we can conceive only of perceptions, then according to Hume’s principle it is only perceptions whose existence we may regard as possible. We may observe, moreover, that the remarks we have thus far examined do not imply that perceptions, as such, exist, but only that their existence is possible. Were there no further texts available to us from among Hume’s writings, we might justifiably conclude that what he calls “perceptions” are to be understood as a realm of mere essences which, taken together, comprehend all possibility, but which are not, of themselves, existence.”

[1] David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888), pp. 32, 250, Hereafter cited as Treatise.

[2] Treatise, pp.19-20. Cf> David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. and with an introduction by Henry D. Aiken(New York: Hafner Library of Classic, Hafner Publishing Company, 1948), p. 19, Philo speaking. Hereafter cited as Dialogues.

[3] Treatise, p. 89

[4] Treatise, p.32

[5] Treatise, p. 43

[6] David Hume, “An Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding,” in An Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding and an Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. and with an introduction by L.A. Selby-Bigge (2d ed.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902), p. 35. Hereafter cited as “Understanding.” Cf. Dialogues, p. 58, Cleanthes speaking.

[7] “Understanding.” P. 157

[8] Treatise p. 43.

[9] Treatise, p. 72; cf. p. 366.

[10] Treatise, pp. 1, 96.

[11] Treatise, p. 236.

[12] Treatise, p. 250

[13] Treatise, p. 32.

[14] Treatise, p. 32.

[15] Treatise, p.43. Cf. “Understanding,” p. 164.

[16] Treatise, p. 67; cf. pp.197,212.

[17] Treatise, p. 234.

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Cartesian Circle

Posted by allzermalmer on March 18, 2012

This blog will be based on an article by Lynn E. Ross, which was called “Cartesian Circle”. It appeared in a philosophical journal called Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Sep., 1965), pp. 80-89.

Ross brings up what is said to be the Cartesian Circle.

“Descartes’ reasoning is often said to be circular, in that he deduces the existence of God from clear and distinct perceptions and then deduces the reliability of our clear and distinct perceptions from the existence of God.”

Now Ross is going to try to show that when Descartes uses Clear and Distinct perceptions to prove the existence of God is true, but there is a difference. Descartes is not assuming the reliability of all clear and distinct perceptions. Descartes only presupposes the the reliability of Clear and Distinct perceptions that are known through the “light of nature”, through “metaphysical certainty” and not subject to “metaphysical doubt”.

Now what is a psychological certainty when it comes to a certain proposition?

“[W]e cannot conceive of its being false except on the rather extravagant supposition that even when we perceive it as true we are being deceived by some very powerful demon.”

Now what is something that we can call epistemological certainty?

“Those clear and distinct perceptions that we cannot be conceived to be false even on this demon hypothesis”

Psychological certainty isn’t metaphysical certainty. Psychological certainty is suspect to metaphysical doubt. Epistemological certainty isn’t metaphysical doubt. Epistemological certainty is based on metaphysical certainty, which comes from a faculty of the mind known as “light of nature” or “natural light”. We now have two levels or certainty.

These two levels of certainty have a corresponding of two levels of doubt.

[1.] There is metaphysical doubt, which is a proposition being conceived to be false on the demon hypothesis, and can be conceived to be false even without the demon hypothesis. For example, we can think that there is a world of corporeal things, like a chair, that exists independent of the person. This is called under question by the demon-hypothesis. But, we can also call into doubt something like I went to the grocery store yesterday, which we don’t need the demon-hypothesis to call into question because we are not even psychologically certain.  So metaphysical doubt is brought up when something can be false under the demon-hypothesis, which is something that is psychologically certain, or called false even when we ignore the demon-hypothesis and aren’t psychologically certain about it.

[2.] There is metaphysical certainty, which is a proposition that can’t be conceived of being false, even under the demon hypothesis (metaphysical doubt). These positions are what are given to use through the “light of Nature”. We can come to know that we exist, and this is metaphysically certain. Not even the demon hypothesis could change our minds of this. Thus, it is metaphysically certain and also epistemologically certain. He also comes to hold that God is part of these beliefs that are metaphysically certain and so epistemologically certain.

One of the things about Descartes idea is that any system that has metaphysical certainty must be based on premises that are given to us through the light of nature, and this would mean that we would have to exclude things, no matter how psychologically certain we are of them, even if we take it to be extravagant that we would have to give them up because they’re not given by the light of nature.

One of the examples of a conclusion that Descartes comes to, through the light of nature, is the Cogito of “I think, therefore I exist”. For example, he goes on to say that “the natural light…has shown me that I am from the fact that I doubt…Then without doubt I exist also if he [the demon] deceives me, and let him deceive me as much as he will, he can never cause me to be nothing so long as I think that I am something.”

Descartes comes to find, through natural light, that he exists and this cannot be doubted. This not being able to be doubted, makes it both metaphysical certain and also epistemologically certain. Descartes also goes on point out the thinking being, Descartes, has within him the idea of God, which contains all God’s attributes that are known through the light of nature alone. He comes to this conclusion based on something else that natural light gives to him.

“Now it is manifest by the natural light that there must at least be as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in its effect…Thus the light of nature causes me to know clearly that the ideas in me are like pictures or images which can, in truth, easily fall short of the perfection of the objects from which they have been derived, but which can never contain anything greater or more perfect.”

Descartes comes to the conclusion that he exists, which is based on metaphysical certainty, which happens by the light of nature. He also comes to the conclusion that there must be as much reality in the efficient and total cause as in its effect. This is also known by natural light. He finds that many of his ideas can be formed from what exists already in himself, by the light of the axioms that the effect contains as much reality as the cause, except for one. Through a process of elimination, he finds that he can’t conceivably have formed from what already exists within himself, yet he has the idea of God who contains this ability.

Descartes says that “Because the light of nature makes it very clear that whoever knows something more perfect than himself cannot be the author of his being, because then he would have given himself all the perfections of which he had cognizance…”

From all of this, Metaphysical certainty shows that if he was created at some point in time, then he must have been created by God. Descartes says that “I see nothing in all that I have just said which by the light of nature is not manifest to anyone who desires to think attentively on the subject.”

But Descartes has to make one further point.

“But thought I assume that perhaps I have always existed just as I am at present, neither can I escape the force of this reasonings, and imagine that the conclusion to be drawn from this is, that I need not seek for any author of my existence…For…in order to be conserved in each moment in which it endures, a substance has need of the same power and action as would be necessary to produce and create it anew, supposing it did not exist, so that the light of nature shows us clearly that the distinction between creation and conservation is solely a distinction of the reason.”

These things help lead to his cosmological argument for the existence of God. These were all based on, what Descartes calls, “light of nature” or “natural light”. These things were said to be based on metaphysical certainty, or epistemological certainty.

Descartes also comes up with this ontological argument, and there is supposed to be a detailed account of the argument in his Fifth Meditation. This meditation compares God’s property of existence with properties possessed by numbers and geometrical figures. However, there is a difference between those of mathematics and that of God. The one of God is known through natural light, while that of mathematics isn’t. The reason is that Descartes evil-demon even called into question mathematics, like “angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles”. This was called into question by the evil-demon, even though the idea of triangles is psychologically certain.

“The reason for comparing the existence of God with various properties of mathematical entities is to explain how existence is inseparable from God’s nature. Descartes’ purpose is not to suggest that we have the same level of certainty about God’s properties and the properties of mathematical entities. The latter are among the things subjected to metaphysical doubt earlier in the Meditations; their reliability is shown only after it has first been shown that God exists. The properties of God, on the other hand, are known by the light of nature and are not subject to metaphysical doubt…It is inconceivable that God should not have the property of existence, just as it is inconceivable that a triangle should not have three sides. And yet the inconceivability is not exactly the same in the two cases. For we can suppose that triangles need not be three-sided and that we are being deceived into thinking that they must be three-sided. But we cannot be deceived with respect to what we know through the light of nature, such as that existence is necessarily a property of God.”

What is being brought up here is that Descartes does not exclude the possibility of the existence of God being known with greater certainty than those attributes of mathematics. The latter are known through psychological certainty, and the former are known through the light of nature, which is metaphysical certainty.

So Ross comes to conclude that “for Descartes the ontological argument rests only on premises which are given by the light of nature. This means, since it is impossible for him to doubt or in any way pretend that the things known by the light of nature are false, that the ontological argument is metaphysically certain, and that it is therefore equivalent to the cosmological argument in certainty.”

Descartes also once said that “it is incumbent on us to imagine that he is a deceiver if we wish to cast doubt upon our clear and distinct perceptions.” Ross suggests that “no contrary reason” could cast doubt upon the truth of clear and distinct perceptions is that “they were only open to metaphysical doubt under the demon hypothesis”. However, now that Descartes has reached God, he can now say that all clear and distinct perceptions are true.

What happens is this: Some clear and distinct perceptions are metaphysically certain even with the Demon hypothesis. Some clear and distinct perceptions are metaphysically doubtful with the Demon hypothesis. Those clear and distinct perceptions that are metaphysically certain, with the Demon hypothesis, allow us to combine them to each other to reach the existence of God. Applying metaphysically certain ideas only leads to other metaphysically certain ideas, which becomes that of the existence of God. And this is known by natural light, and also that God is no deceiver. Now those clear and distinct things that could be doubted under the Demon hypothesis can no longer be doubted, because God has banished this demon away by God’s very existence, and this leads to all clear and distinct perceptions are metaphysically certain. In other words, those that clear and distinct perceptions that were in metaphysical doubt, turn out to be metaphysically certain once it is found that there is no deceiver.

Descartes makes a reply to an alleged circularity with is Clear and Distinct idea and God.

“…when I said that we could know nothing with certainty unless we were first aware that God existed, I announced in express terms that I referred only to the science apprehending such conclusions as can recur in memory without attending further to the proofs which led me to make them. Further, knowledge of first principles is not usually called science by dialecticians. But when we become aware that we are thinking beings, this is a primitive act of knowledge derived from no syllogistic reasonings. He who says, ‘I think, hence I am, or exist’, does not deduce existence form thought by syllogism, but, by a simple act of mental vision, recognizes it as if it were a thing that is known per se.”

Ross comes to a conclusion like this, based on what has been said before.

“[Descartes] is placing some limitation on the clear and distinct perceptions whose truth is first established after the existence of God is proved. Not all clear and distinct perceptions depend upon our knowing that there is a God, but only those that are in some unspecified conclusions of demonstrations, as opposed to the sort of first principles that one recognizes “by a simple act of mental vision…as if it were a thing that is known per se.” I take these first principles known per se to be metaphysically certain principles given by the light of nature, and I suggest that “such conclusions as can recur in memory without attending further to the proofs which led me to make them” is his way of referring to those clear and distinct perceptions not given by the light of nature. For in metaphysics the light of nature provides the only perceptions whose truth is completely and independently certain and need to be demonstrated. And the truth of the of the remaining clear and distinct perceptions, since they are subject to the demon hypothesis and to metaphysical doubt, needs to be demonstrated from the existence of a benevolent God. We are metaphysically certain that they are true only so long as we remember that their truth was metaphysically demonstrated from first principles known per se. When we do not remember this demonstration (which involves the demonstration of the existence of a God who would not deceive us with respect to our clear and distinct perceptions), these clear and distinct perceptions are once more subject to the demon hypothesis and thus lack metaphysical certainty. If this is Descartes’ meaning, he is clearly justified in rejecting the charge of circularity.”

Ross, in concluding the paper, makes a certain point. He finds that Descartes can escape the charge of circularity, but Ross things that there is another possible problem, as he has interpreted Descartes. He points out that he has not really shown that some of his other metaphysically certain positions, besides his “questionable” “I think, therefore I exist”, withstand the Demon hypothesis. Ross, in fact, goes on to think that his other metaphysically certain premises even fall to the demon hypothesis, which would make them metaphysically doubtful. Ross says this because Descartes usually produces this claim of a certain proposition being known by the “light of nature”, and never really offers any argument to support these metaphysically certain positions that he knows by the “light of nature”.

As Ross says, “from then on (after getting the cogito ergo sum principle) he smuggles in one crucial premise after another without ever attempting to establish the metaphysical certainty of even one. The result is that his metaphysics is based upon a great many premises whose “metaphysical certainty” is at best highly questionable, and at worst non-existent. This, rather than circularity, is the basic flaw in Descartes’ work.” I, myself, might add one thing in this regard. Descartes held that we have some innate ideas, and so these innate ideas would appear to be what is known by “light of nature”. So he doesn’t, in some sense, have to defend these premises that are known by the “light of nature”. This would be consistent with his whole system. So one can question these innate ideas if they want to attack his system.

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Alleged Cartesian Circle

Posted by allzermalmer on February 24, 2012

This blog is based on a paper I once had to do for a philosophy class. The paper is about Renee Descartes and his book Meditations on First Philosophy. When this book came out, or right before it came out, Descartes gave a copy of the book to other intellectuals of his time. He wanted them to give feed back, and so some presented objections to certain parts of his book. One of the allegations made was that Descartes argued in a circle. The teacher asked us to give a defense of Descartes against this allegation. There were three things that had to be done in the paper: 1. State what the Cartesian Circle is suppose to be, 2. Give Descartes response to this allegation of a circle, and 3. Defend Descartes against this allegation. But the teacher wanted us to focuse more on the Evil Demon as part of the problem than the Memory. I received a B+ on the paper, which doesn’t mean much.

The Cartesian Circle is an alleged circle between Descartes idea of God and his truth rule, which he calls the Clear and Distinct rule. The Clear and Distinct rule states that something is true if and only if we clearly and distinctly think about it. Desecrate, supposedly, says that we are sure about what we clearly and distinctly perceive to be true because God exists, and we are sure that God exists because we clearly and distinctly perceive that God exists.

Descartes tries to formulate a theory of truth, and this theory of truth is to help him escape some skepticism that was set up in the First Mediation. These were skeptical arguments based on methodological doubt. The skeptical arguments, raised by Descartes are the argument from illusion, the dream argument, and the evil-demon argument. Descartes tries to escape these problems with his idea of clear and distinct ideas. Whatever can be clearly and distinctly is true, and this means we are not being deceived when we say that they are true. However, at the same time, God helps guarantee that whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived is true.

Antoine Arnauld, who read Descartes First Mediation, was the first to raise what is termed the Cartesian Circle. He states, in the second objection, in regards to the chapter of 5th mediation: “You are not yet certain of the existence of God, and you say that you are not certain of anything, and cannot know anything clearly and distinctly until you have achieved clear and certain knowledge of the existence of God. It follows from this that you do not yet clearly and distinctly know that you are a thinking thing, since, on your own admission, that knowledge depends on the clear knowledge of an existing God; and this you have not yet proved in the passage where you draw the conclusion that you clearly know what you are.”[1]

Descartes responds by trying to point out that he was only talking about knowledge of conclusions that we are no longer attending to with our thinking. This is pointing out that he was talking about knowledge while we are no longer currently thinking them. Descartes pointed out “I think, therefore I exist” only when thinking. That means that when we are not thinking, we do not exist. Moreover, when we are not thinking of some conclusion now, we are not certain of them. Nevertheless, this was specifically concerning a conclusion based on argument from which we deduced them, even though we are not thinking of those premises that lead to that conclusion. This is all dealing with “knowledge”, but not with “First Principles” or metaphysics.

Descartes says, “When I said that we can know nothing for certain until we are aware that God exists, I expressly declared that I was speaking only of knowledge of those conclusions which can be recalled when we are no longer attending to the arguments by means of which we deduced them. Now awareness of first principles is not normally called “knowledge” by dialecticians…”[2]

Descartes response is that God is a self-evident, or, as he says, “For what is more self-evident than the fact that the Supreme Being exists, or that God, to whose essence alone existence belongs, exists?”[3] In addition, it is from God that we are guaranteed the Clear and Distinct rule which forms the basis of knowledge. We, more easily, state that he holds that God is a First Principle.

A defense of Descartes could go something like this. Descartes called his work “First Philosophy”, and during the time at which he wrote, and even in modern times, is known as metaphysics. Metaphysics is about ontology, or reality qua reality. We can take reality as existing before we even have knowledge of it. So take a baby, reality exists before the baby has knowledge of this reality.

Descartes uses a method of doubt, which is methodological doubt. He brings up arguments from illusion, argument from dreams, and argument about an evil-demon that is constantly deceiving us by presenting things to our senses that do not exist independent of us. However, with all of these things, there is one thing that we do know which is that we think and so we exist, or that a thinking thing exists. This means that no matter what, we cannot be deceived that we exist because we are thinking.

There is one idea that Descartes has, which is that of God. This idea of God contains that God is not a deceiver because God is good and fraud and deception are a defect. God being good means that God does not deceive. God is also perfect, and this is the highest of all ideas, that of God. God forms the foundation of the world, in some sense. Moreover, all our faults in reasoning rely on ourselves because we do not clearly and distinctly perceive our ideas. We form faulty ideas.

The faulty ideas we form are not because of God, because God is not a deceiver. It is because of our own limitations that we form mistakes, not because of God. It is because of God that we can ignore the evil-demon. The evil-demon is not perfect and is not good. While God is, perfect and is good. God forms the “First Principle” from which we form and build our knowledge. We first come to find that we exist, and when we find that, we exist and come to find the idea of God in our thoughts or mind. This idea is greater than any other idea that we can form.

The Clear and Distinct rule comes after we find God to be self-evident. In addition, it is because of God that the Clear and Distinct rule obtains its force. Without God, we would not be able to use the Clear and Distinct rule. This is because we would have to contend with an evil-demon that is constantly deceiving us, except for our own existence, because it would need something to exist to be deceiving. The evil-demon could fool us into believing something like 2+2=4, even if we Clearly and Distinctly come to this idea. This would make all knowledge we have, besides our own existence, to be faulty.

Moreover, some might say that God is not self-evident to them. However, there are some things that most of us Clearly and Distinctly know, while others might not. “Some of the things I Clearly and distinctly perceive are obvious to everyone, while others are discovered only by those who look more closely and investigate more carefully; but once they have been discovered, the latter are judged to be just as certain as the former.”[4] In other words, all people who know geometry would find that the square on the hypotenuse is equal to the square on the other sides of a right-angled triangle. This is self-evident, if not clear and distinct. While others might not have discovered it, when they are taught it becomes self-evident to them. This too would be with the case of God.

However, those who do not come to this self-evident truth are set on all sides with knowledge that could change like the tides of the sea, and would be constantly deceived. It is for this reason that Descartes comes up with arguments for the existence of God in order to bring them to the self-evident that they themselves have not investigated more carefully.

Now take the example of God being the Earth, the foundation. This is reality or the ground of reality. Now that we have reality, we want to come to know of reality further. The Clear and Distinct rule is what we use to build knowledge of reality upon this foundation, and it gives us certain knowledge of the world. It is like a crane that picks up the pieces of cinder block and puts them together to form a building. Without this foundation for the crane to stand on, the crane would fall apart, we would have no knowledge of reality qua reality, and there would be no building. This building would be the building of knowledge.

Further, those who do not believe in God would have a building of knowledge without a sturdy foundation and would collapse as if it was hit by a earthquake without a sound foundation. Without God, no matter how many Clear and Distinct ideas you have, this would only be based on psychological certainty and not epistemological certainty. This means that one would only be psychologically certain that 2+2=4 and not epistemologically certain that 2+2=4. No one who knows of that the building isn’t sturdy would want to go to live in that unsturdy building. This is why Descartes uses arguments to present the self-evident to those who are not aware of it, which they might not be aware of the self-evident, like to construct an equilateral triangle on a given finite straight line.

For example, in the book done by Spinoza called Principles of Cartesian Philosophy. Spinoza tries to lay out the philosophy of Descartes from his Meditations, which is laid out in a geometrical form. He defines some terms, and gives some axioms. From this, Spinoza derives the Cartesian philosophy. One thing to be noticed is that the first four propositions deal with things related to the “I am” or “I think”. The next eight propositions deal with God. Now, the first 12 propositions don’t deal with the Clear and Distinct rule. It is not till the 13th proposition that Spinoza brings up the Clear and Distinct Rule. Now if we are to consider Spinoza to be faithful to the Cartesian philosophy set out in the Meditations, then that means that there is no Cartesian Circle of needing God to prove the Clear and Distinct rule and needing the Clear and Distinct rule to prove God.

[2] Ibid. pg. 139

[3] Ibid. pg. 109

[4] Ibid. p. 108

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