One Demon of Knowledge, or Epistemology, is the Evil Demon presented by Descartes. The demon makes that which is true to appear false, which also means those things that are false now appear to be true things. So Demon makes it appear that it is false that the University of North Carolina won NCAA Basketball championship. This, in turn, means the demon makes it appear that true the University of Gonzaga won NCAA championship. The Evil Demon attacks the Truth condition of knowledge.

The Debasing Demon of Knowledge attacks the Justification condition of knowledge. In this case, the Demon will make it appear *as if* have a justification for the belief that the University of North Carolina won NCAA Basketball championship. The demon does not affect the truth condition, so it is still true that North Carolina won the championship. The only thing the demon affects is the justification portion of knowledge. It makes it false that you have justification for knowledge claim, but it appears *as if* you do have a justification for knowledge claim.

The logical connective of conjunction would combine each of these two separate propositions together. Each of these propositions would be known as a conjunct that makes up a conjunction. Conjunct of P and conjunct of Q make up the conjunction of ‘Both The Golden State Warriors won the Western Conference Championship of the NBA in 2016 & The Cleveland Cavaliers won the Eastern Conference Championship of the NBA in 2016’. This can be represented as ‘P&Q’.

A conjunction is only true when each conjunct is true. A conjunction is false when either one of the conjuncts is false or both conjuncts are false. In the example presented, it is true that both teams won the Conference championships in 2016. So the conjunction is a true proposition.

Logic tells us that from false hypotheses, or hypothesis, that true predictions follow from it. Suppose that **P** means **‘The Golden State Warriors won the NBA Championship in 2015’** and that **Q** means **‘The Golden State Warriors won the NBA Championship in 2016’**. From these two propositions, we can form the conjunction of **‘Both The Golden State Warriors won the NBA Championship in 2015 & The Golden State Warriors won the NBA Championship in 2016’**. This can be represented as **‘P&Q’**.

Taking **‘P&Q’** as a hypothesis, we can prove that some propositions follow from that hypothesis. One of these propositions that follow is **P**. So from the hypothesis of **‘Both The Golden State Warriors won the NBA Championship in 2015 & The Golden State Warriors won the NBA Championship in 2016’** that it necessarily follows by rules of logic that **‘The Golden State Warriors won the NBA Championship in 2015’**.

Suppose **‘P&Q’** then necessarily follows **‘P’**.

The hypothesis presented is false, **P&Q** is false. One of the conjuncts is false, **Q** is false. One of the conjuncts is true, **P** is true. So the conjunction is false. But from this false hypothesis, we find that a true conclusion follows from it.

This post is based on a paper that was done for a class on epistemology. The paper was about a paper called “**A Defense of Skepticism**“, authored by Peter Unger, and appeared in the philosophical journal *A Philosophical Review*, Vol. 80, No. 2 (Apr., 1971), pp. 198-219.

“Both propositions of “Forty-five plus fifty-six is the same as one hundred and one” and “45+56=101” are propositions that *hardly* anyone knows, under Peter Unger’s skeptical thesis. Under the skeptical thesis presented by Unger, most people don’t know those propositions are true, though some might, & those people that don’t know those propositions are true typically talk *as if *those propositions are true. In fact, it will be given that there are a great many propositions that we may reasonably believe or a great many propositions that we may suppose to be true, while never knowing them to be true.

Unger’s skepticism wants to deals within common idea of language and knowledge. Skepticism presented by Unger deals with language, since that is the background in which some philosophers believe that they have solved some skeptical problems about knowledge. For example, the common idea of language and knowledge that Unger is working under is that the language we speak is adequate at expressing truths. From this common idea, Unger presents idea of how our language habits possibly serve us well in practical ways, while these language habits have us saying what’s false rather than true.

Our language habits that involve *positive assertions* contain special features that Unger want’s to point out, and which also motivates his skeptical thesis. There are absolute terms within our languages or language habits, and some of these absolute terms are basic. From these basic absolute terms, we may build up other absolute terms. Examples of absolute terms are both “flat” and “certain”. The proposition “That is a cube” involves the basic absolute term of “flat”, since a cube’s surface is flat. If we don’t know a basic absolute term of “flat”, then we can’t know what is built up from those basic absolute terms, which is “That is a cube”.

“That is a cube” is a proposition that many people might reasonably believe, or “The road is flat”. But the basic absolute term of “flat” generally fails to apply to the world. A cube is a geometrical object which has no width or depth. However, those objects that we generally come across do have width or depth. So those objects that we call “cubes” aren’t something that applies to the world. We may talk *as if* “That is a cube” or “The road is flat”. It is reasonable to suppose or believe that they are true. From whatever is built, or has any part of, of that basic absolute term would also generally be false.

The skepticism presented by Unger implies some things that might be deemed impossible to accept, since it would imply something about the functioning of our language. It would attack a common idea about language being adequate to express truth. Unger’s thesis would have it that common terms of language involve the use of error systematically in expressing truth. Two common terms that would be found to use error systematically would be “know” and “knowledge”. While we believe what we say is true, what we believe is actually false.

Suppose that an individual believes that “this region of space is a vacuum” is true. Now further suppose that contrary to the individual’s belief, “this region of space isn’t a vacuum” since “this region of space has the slightest trace elements of gaseous stuff”. Now further suppose that for practical purposes principle, there isn’t an important difference whether you falsely believe the first supposition or truly believes the second supposition, i.e. “this region of space has the slightest trace elements of gaseous stuff”.

One might think that the first supposition implies the practical purpose principle, since there is no important difference. Things would go on as we practically expected with the region of space being a vacuum, since if the region is a vacuum then whatever gaseous content it has is none. Even giving such a thought, there is still something that is unique. The second supposition doesn’t imply the practical purpose principle. The principle may be derived from the first supposition and can’t be derived from the second supposition. In other words, from “this region of space is a vacuum” we can derive that the region of space doesn’t contain any gaseous elements or doesn’t practically contain any gaseous elements. The practical result of the first supposition would show that there aren’t any gaseous elements, so the practical result would have been no gaseous elements. However, by the second supposition, wouldn’t practically show up as a result. So our belief can still be reasonably supposed true, even though false.

The example given above is to help point out that we can have false beliefs, even though the beliefs are reasonable, and they don’t clash with experiences of life, or way we experience the world. We can have many false beliefs, based on some of the account that was given above. The practical purpose would come from positive assertions, since the first supposition was a positive assertion and the second assertion was a negative assertion. From the positive assertion we were able to derive the practical purpose principle, and we couldn’t derive the practical purpose principle from the negative assertion. The individual isn’t in position to determine if the region of space contains gaseous elements, given the practical limitation that was given from the derived principle from first supposition.

Those terms of knowledge belong to a class of terms in our language, and these are those absolute terms. “Flat” is an absolute term, so saying that “a surface is flat” is also saying that matters of degree are not instanced in the surface to any degree. Being flat means no degrees of being bumpy or having a curve, i.e. perfectly flat. “Bumpy” and “curve” are taken as examples of relative terms, and so we notice that there is some connection between absolute terms and relative terms.

Relative terms and some absolute terms, specifically those of basic absolute terms, have the special ability of being modified by many different terms. We can take a term such as “very”, can be applied to either relative terms or basic absolute terms, and we can obtain something like “the table is *very* bumpy” or “the table is *very* flat”. These modifications of either the relative term or basic absolute term are one based on matters or degree, or indicate matters of degree.

“Cube” is an absolute term, even though it isn’t a basic absolute term. This is because “Cube” is built up off of the absolute term of “flat” & “straight”. “Cube” doesn’t admit of matter of degree, even though the basic absolute terms used to build up the term do admit to matter of degree. In other words, it takes two basic absolute terms of “flat” and “straight” to build up the absolute term of “cube” & “cube” doesn’t allow for matter of degree while “straight” and “flat” do allow for matter of degree. Not all absolute terms can be modified by matters of degree, but some like “flat” or “straight” can be, and all relative terms can be modified by matters of degrees.

Some might think to take basic absolute terms as the same relative terms, but this won’t do. There is a special distinction between both types of terms when it comes to matter of degrees. When we say that “a surface is *very *flat” or “a surface is *very* bumpy”, we are saying *how* flat the surface is or *how* bumpy the surface is. Intuitively, there is a difference between these two. Flat being an absolute term, it has an ultimate location in which we may judge things. We are saying *how close* the surface is *to being* flat. We have perfectly flat, which is what the absolute term of flat means, and saying it is very flat allows us to say how close it is being perfectly flat since we have the index of perfectly flat to compare it with.

When it comes to relative terms, like “a surface is very bumpy”, since “a surface is bumpy” implies “a surface is very bumpy”. However, from “a surface is very bumpy” we can’t derive that “a surface is bumpy” because might be that the surface isn’t bumpy at all. We notice an asymmetry, and this comes from an intuitive level. Something would seem strange in our common language to express “a surface is bumpy” and deny that “a surface is very bumpy” is implied, or “a surface is very bumpy” and affirm that “a surface is bumpy”.

Either both the first surface is flat and the second surface is not flat or both the first surface is closer to being flat than the second surface. This is a more complex way in which Unger deals with the matter of degrees when they are applied to basic absolute terms. This helps to change things so that when we deal with relative terms and matter of degree, the same interpretation of common language doesn’t hold.

Basic absolute terms can at least be partially defined by relative terms, or the matter of degree terms. And since absolute terms are defined by basic absolute terms, this in turn means that absolute terms that aren’t basic absolute terms are also partially defined by relative terms. These relative terms help to point out the negative accept of the skeptical thesis presented by Unger. For supposing that “flat” is a basic absolute term, which is defined in part by a relative term, means that something isn’t flat at all, or not in the least, bumpy. This is the negative relative requirement that basic absolute terms have to meet when partially defined by relative terms.

Absolute terms and Relative terms are both part of our language, but we also have things that are part of our language that are neither absolute terms nor relative terms. Some of these terms are unmarried or married, true and false, or right and wrong. But Unger points out that some of these terms can be taken as “absolute” in some language.

Some terms of our language are followed by propositional clauses, and we may call these terms propositional terms. So one might wonder, are these propositional terms, like “certain”, absolute or relative terms. A term like “certain” has two things that need to be made clear about them, or interpretations that may be given to it. (1) Certain in which certain is *not* certain *of* anything, or (2) certain in which certain *is* certain *of* something. An example of (1) is “It is certain that it is raining”, since the term “it” doesn’t appear to have any reference. This is the impersonal context, which is the impersonal idea of certainty. An example of (2) is “He is certain that it is raining”, since the term “he” does appear to have a reference. This is the personal context, which is the personal idea of certainty.

Unger believes that certainty has to contain both of those conditions; it is both impersonal certainty and personal certainty. What comes from each of these on their own is that certainty involves no doubt. So we get that “If certain that p then isn’t doubtful that p” with impersonal certainty. With personal certainty we get that, “In his mind, if he’s certain that p then isn’t doubtful that p.” All doubt is absent in his mind.

Certain are now connected negative definitions of certainty, which is an absolute term. Certainty or Certain are common concepts with language, and they are built on absolute term which has a negative definition.

When an individual says that he is certain that p, they are saying they aren’t confident of p & more than confident of p. If they say they are confident that p then they are saying they are confident that p. So there is a difference between an individual being certain and being confident. So you can be as confident as you want because of the highest reasonable belief.

Take these two propositions, either (1) “He’s (really) very certain of p” or (2) “he’s very certain of p”. The second proposition says more about certainty than the first proposition. The second proposition gets ride of one matter of degree. Each of these modifiers is saying that they aren’t certain, but one less degree of modifiers saying that they aren’t certain. This might seem implausible at first, but there has been a pattern in which to place our languages of language to express truth.

Someone saying that “I’m more certain that p than I am that q” is the same as “I am either certain that p while not certain that q or I’m more nearly certain that p than I am that q”. The first part of the disjunction tells us that either p or q is certain and it was proposition p. The second disjunction tells us that aren’t certain of either proposition and one is of a higher degree that the other. However, someone saying that I’m more confident that p than I am that q” isn’t the same as “I’m either both confident that p and not confident that q or I’m more nearly confident that p than q.”, since confident of both.

Given these expositions of propositional terms, absolute terms v. relative terms, basic absolute terms, impersonal certainty v. personal certainty, we can come to skepticism about many things that we reasonably believe. It can be taken that “lots of surfaces of physical things are flat” is a reasonable belief. But this comes to contradict the experience of life. We take a microscope and we start to examine those objects that we commonly come upon, and we start to notice that they aren’t flat. They take on the form of being bumpy. So now the absolute term is one that is false and yet for practical purposes it is true. The absolute term was even a reasonable belief that is or was held.

One of the basic problems of absolute terms is that there are counter-examples to them, and the absolute terms are part of language to express truth. These absolute terms, at least basic ones, are shown to be false by experiences of life. However, these terms are very useful and they do express some truth. Absolute terms have reason to doubt, since we do have a counter-example. Most absolute terms would have counter-examples, but that doesn’t mean that all absolute terms have counter-examples.

Going back to previous example, experience of life presents what seems to be a smooth stone & look through a microscope at the smooth stone. The smooth stone is found to actually be bumpy, which means that it isn’t smooth. To account for the stone being bumpy, an inference to the best explanation could be used. It could be that the smoothness is built up from the finer part of the stone which has small bumps. It can further be better explained that the bumps are made of something even smaller, like atoms, which combine in a certain way in which smooth stone is final outcome, while there are no smooth stones in the combination to begin with, i.e. neither atoms are smooth nor atoms are stones. This belief would have plenty of evidence, and be a reasonable belief. However, the degrees of “deeper” explanations to account for the counter-example can eventually end in an absolute matter where there is no counter-example to be found. So we eventually come to the point that we should suspend judgment on this issue. We don’t know either.

The real sting of Unger’s skepticism comes down to this form: If person is certain of p, then not anything of which the person is more certain. So the individual can be certain of p, which means that person isn’t as certain, i.e. isn’t certain, of q. This comes back to this point, if more certain of another thing, then either certain of other while and not being certain of first or more nearly certain of other thing than of the first. Suppose that it is logically possible that there’s something an individual might be more certain of than they are now of a given thing, then the person wasn’t really certain to begin with.

Is it reasonable to believe that there are automobiles? It would seem to be an experience of life. However, a dilemma can be presented to them. Either more certain that there are automobiles or aren’t. This can be because someone is more certain that they exist than certain automobiles are an experience of life. Since they are more certain that they exist, then certain that they exist and aren’t certain that automobiles exist. So when someone is presented with something that they think they are more certain of than another, they are saying that they aren’t certain of second. If they hold open that what they hold to be more certain can possibly be false, then they aren’t certain of it to begin with, either.

So from this, we can know one thing, but most everything else that we think we are certain of isn’t certain of. So we can hold that we are more certain of our own existence than of 45+56=101. For practical purposes though, we are certain that 45+56=101. This would be us having a reasonable belief without it being true, i.e. certain that 45+56=101. Even something like some basic arithmetic can fall for skepticism, even though it is not a universal skepticism in which no one knows anything.

The skepticism that Unger presents deals with knowledge being certain, which has also been a common idea of epistemology. However, some suppose that knowledge requires just belief, or at least reasonable belief such that, if both believe that p implies know that p & believe that p implies p then p implies know that p. This would appear to lead to omniscience, which seems to contradict experience of life. So such a supposition would be an absolute term which is false but practically useful. This belief is reasonable is because it meets certain conditions, which helps allow us to say that we have knowledge. However, these conditions don’t exclude having a false belief.

So Unger’s skepticism is an attack on language is capable of expressing truth. Unger holds that language is capable of expressing truth, but that it also systematically expresses error as well. Language relies on positive assertions, which require negative definitions. These definitions are based on absolute terms that are basic, while there are absolute terms that aren’t basic and there are relative terms. The basic absolute terms help to define absolute terms that aren’t basic. These basic absolute terms end up having counter-examples. Our common way of expressing language would have error.

One of the words that we use for knowledge is “certain”, which is an absolute term. However, based on the definition of being certain, there can only be one thing that we are certain about. So we may use the knowledge term of certain, or that we have knowledge, but we truly don’t have knowledge. The skepticism that Unger presents show there isn’t much of knowledge that we have, since there isn’t much that we are certain about, but that doesn’t mean we don’t have any knowledge. Unger’s skeptical thesis is consistent that we don’t know anything, but it doesn’t imply that we don’t know anything. We just know less than we say that we know or we are more certain of one thing than we are of another, or we aren’t certain at all.”

]]>Here is a proof of Modus Ponens. This proof will use Polish Notation, relies on three axioms & one rule of inference. The proof for Modus Ponens will rely on 13 Lemmas. This axiomatic system only has two primitive logical operators, which is C and N, or Implication and Negation.

A quick note on notation.

C stands for implication, i.e. –>

N stand for negation, i.e. ~

Axiom 1: CCpqCCqrCpr [Hypothetical Syllogism]

Axiom 2: CCNppp [Clavis Law, i.e. Reductio Ad Absurdum]

Axiom 3: CpCNpq [Dun Scotus Law, i.e. Law of Denying Antecedent]

Inference Rule:

Rule of Detachment (MP): Φ & CΦΩ implies Ω

Lemma 4: CCCCqrCprsCCpqs

1. CCpqCCqrCpr [sub. p/Cpq, q/CCqrCpr, r/s in Axiom 1]

2. CCCpqCCqrCprCCCCqrCprsCCpqs

3. CCCCqrCprsCCpqs [(1)/(2) MP] Q.E.D.

Lemma 5: CCpCqrCCsqCpCsr

1. CCCCqrCprsCCpqs [sub. q/Cqr, r/Csr, s/CCsqCpCsr in L4]

2. CCCCCqrCsrCpCsrCCsqCpCsrCCpCqrCCsqCpCsr

3. CCCCqrCprsCCpqs [sub. p/s, s/CpCsr in L4]

4. CCCCCqrCsrCpCsrCCsqCpCsr

5. CCpCqrCCsqCpCsr [(2)/(4) MP] Q.E.D.

Lemma 6: CCpqCCCprsCCqrs

1. CCCCqrCprsCCpqs [sub. s/CCCprsCCqrs in L4]

2. CCCCqrCprCCCprsCCqrsCCpqCCCprsCCqrs

3. CCpqCCqrCpr [sub. p/Cqr, q/Cpr, r/s in Axiom 1]

4. CCCqrCprCCCprsCCqrs

5. CCpqCCCprsCCqrs [(2)/(4) MP] Q.E.D.

Lemma 7: CCtCCprsCCpqCtCCqrs

1. CCpCqrCCsqCpCsr [sub. p/Cpq, q/CCprs, r/CCqrs, s/t in L5]

2. CCCpqCCCprsCCqrsCCtCCprsCCpqCtCCqrs

3. CCtCCprsCCpqCtCCqrs [(2)/(L6) MP] Q.E.D.

Lemma 9: CCCNpqrCpr

1. CCpqCCqrCpr [sub. q/CNpq in Axiom 1]

2. CCpCNpqCCCNpqrCpr

3. CCCNpqrCpr [(2)/(Axiom 3) MP] Q.E.D.

Lemma 10: CpCCCNpppCCqpp

1. CCCNpqrCpr [sub. r/CCCNpppCCqpp in L9]

2. CCCNpqCCCNpppCCqppCpCCCNpppCCqpp

3. CCpqCCCprsCCqrs [sub. p/Np, r/p, s/p in L6]

4. CCNpqCCCNpppCCqpp

5. CpCCCNpppCqpp [(2)/(4) MP] Q.E.D.

Lemma 11: CCqCCNpppCCNppp

1. CpCCCNpppCCqpp [sub. p/CCNppp in L10]

2. CCCNpppCCCNpCCNpppCCNpppCCqCCNpppCCNppp

3. CCCNpCCNpppCCNpppCCqCCNpppCCNppp [(2)/(Axiom 2) MP]

4. CCNppp [sub. p/CCNppp in Axiom 2]

5. CCNpCCNpppCCNppp

6. CCqCCNpppCCNppp [(3)/(5) MP] Q.E.D.

Lemma 12: CtCCNppp

1. CCCNpqrCpr [sub. p/t, q/CCNppp, r/CCNppp in L9]]

2. CCCNtCCNpppCCNpppCtCCNppp

3. CCqCCNpppCCNppp [sub. q/Nt, in L11]

4. CCNtCCNpppCCNppp

5. CtCCNppp [(2)/(4) MP] Q.E.D.

Lemma 13: CCNpqCtCCqpp

1. CCtCCprsCCpqCtCCqrs [sub. p/Np, r/p, s/p in L7]

2. CCtCCNpppCCNpqCtCCtCCqpp

3. CCNpqCtCCqpp [(2)/(L12) MP] Q.E.D.

Lemma 14: CCCtCCqpprCCNpqr

1. CCpqCCqrCpr [sub. p/CNpq, q/CtCCqpp in Axiom 1]

2. CCCNpqCtCCqppCCCtCCqpprCNpqr

3. CCCtCCqpprCNpqr [(2)/(L13) MP] Q.E.D.

Lemma 15: CCNpqCCqpp

1. CCCtCCqpprCCNpqr [sub. t/NCCqpp, r/Cqpp in L14]

2. CCCNCCqppCCqppCCqppCCNpqCCqpp

3. CCNppp [sub. p/CCqpp in Axiom 2]

4. CCNCCqppCCqppCCqpp

5. CCNpqCCqpp [(2)/(4) MP] Q.E.D.

Lemma 17: CpCCqpp

1. CCCNpqrCpr [sub. r/CCqpp in L9]

2. CCCNpqCCqppCpCCqpp

3. CpCCqpp [(2)/(L15) MP] Q.E.D.

Lemma 18: CqCpq [Law of Affirming Consequent/Law of Simplification]

1. CCpCqrCCsqCpCsr [sub. p/q, q/CNpq, r/q, s/p in L5]

2. CCqCCNpqqCCpCNpqCqCpq

3. CpCCqpp [sub. p/q, q/Np in L17]

4. CqCCNpqq

5. CCpCNpqCqCpq [(2)/(4) MP]

6. CqCpq [(5)/(Axiom 3) MP] Q.E.D.

Lemma 19: CCCpqrCqr

1. CCpqCCqrCpr [sub. p/q, q/Cpq in Axiom 1]

2. CCqCpqCCCpqrCqr

3. CCCpqrCqr [(2)/(L18) MP] Q.E.D.

Modus Ponens: CpCCpqq

1. CCCpqrCqr [sub. p/Nq, q/p, r/ CCpqq in L19]

2. CCCNqpCCpqqCpCCpqq

3. CCNpqCCqpp [sub. p/q, q/p in L15]

4. CCNqpCCpqq

5. CpCCpqq [(2)/(4) MP] Q.E.D.

Axiomatic Proof of Modus Ponens using standard notation

Axiom 1: (P–>Q)–>((Q–>R)–>(P–>R))

Axiom 2: ~P–>(P–>P)

Axiom 3: P–>(~P–>Q)

Lemma 4: ((((Q–>R)–>(P–>R))–>S)–>((P–>Q)–>S))

- (P–>Q)–>((Q–>R)–>(P–>R)) [sub. P/(P–>Q), Q/((Q–>R)–>(P–>R)), R/S in Axiom 1]
- ((P–>Q)–>((Q–>R)–>(P–>R)))–>((((Q–>R)–>(P–>R))–>S)–>((P–>Q)–>S))
- ((((Q–>R)–>(P–>R))–>S)–>((P–>Q)–>S)) [(1)/(2) MP] Q.E.D.

Lemma 5: ((P–>(Q–>R))–>((S–>Q)–>(P–>(S–>R))))

- ((((Q–>R)–>(P–>R))–>S)–>((P–>Q)–>S)) [sub. Q/ (Q–>R), R/(S–>R), S/((S–>Q)–>(P–>(S–>R))) L4]
- (((((Q–>R)–>(S–>R))–>(P–>(S–>R)))–>((S–>Q)–>(P–>(S–>R))))–>((P–>(Q–>R))–>((S–>Q)–>(P–>(S–>R)))))
- ((((Q–>R)–>(P–>R))–>S)–>((P–>Q)–>S)) [sub. P/S, S/ (P–>(S–>R)) in L4]
- ((((Q–>R)–>(S–>R))–>(P–>(S–>R)))–>((S–>Q)–>(P–>(S–>R))))
- ((P–>(Q–>R))–>((S–>Q)–>(P–>(S–>R)))) [(2)/(4) MP] Q.E.D.

Lemma 6: ((P–>Q)–>(((P–>R)–>S)–>((Q–>R)–>S)))

- ((((Q–>R)–>(P–>R))–>S)–>((P–>Q)–>S)) [sub. s/ (((P–>R)–>S)–>((Q–>R)–>S)) in L4]
- ((((Q–>R)–>(P–>R))–>(((P–>R)–>S)–>((Q–>R)–>S)))–>((P–>Q)–>(((P–>R)–>S)–>((Q–>R)–>S))))
- (P–>Q)–>((Q–>R)–>(P–>R)) [sub. P/ (Q–>R), Q/ (P–>R), R/S in Axiom 1]
- ((Q–>R)–>(P–>R))–>(((P–>R)–>S)–>((Q–>R)–>S))
- ((P–>Q)–>(((P–>R)–>S)–>((Q–>R)–>S))) [(2)/(4) MP] Q.E.D.

Lemma 7: (T–>((P–>R)–>S))–>((P–>Q)–>(T–>((Q–>R)–>S)))

- ((P–>(Q–>R))–>((S–>Q)–>(P–>(S–>R)))) [sub. P/ (P–>Q), Q/ ((P–>R)–>S), R/ ((Q–>R)–>S), S/T in L5]
- (((P–>Q)–>(((P–>R)–>S)–>((Q–>R)–>S)))–>((T–>((P–>R)–>S))–>((P–>Q)–>(T–>((Q–>R)–>S)))))
- (T–>((P–>R)–>S))–>((P–>Q)–>(T–>((Q–>R)–>S))) [(2)/(L6) MP] Q.E.D.

Lemma 9: (((~P–>Q)–>R)–>(P–>R))

- (P–>Q)–>((Q–>R)–>(P–>R)) [sub. Q/(~P–>Q) in Axiom 1]
- (P–>(~P–>Q))–>(((~P–>Q)–>R)–>(P–>R))
- (((~P–>Q)–>R)–>(P–>R)) [(2)/Axiom 3 MP] Q.E.D.

Lemma 10: (P–>(((~P–>P)–>P)–>((Q–>P)–>P)))

- (((~P–>Q)–>R)–>(P–>R)) [sub. R/ (((~P–>P)–>P)–>((Q–>P)–>P)) in L9]
- (((~P–>Q)–>(((~P–>P)–>P)–>((Q–>P)–>P)))–>(P–>(((~P–>P)–>P)–>((Q–>P)–>P))))
- ((P–>Q)–>(((P–>R)–>S)–>((Q–>R)–>S))) [sub. P/~P, R/P, S/P in L6]
- ((~P–>Q)–>(((~P–>P)–>P)–>((Q–>P)–>P)))
- (P–>(((~P–>P)–>P)–>((Q–>P)–>P))) [(2)/(4) MP] Q.E.D.

Lemma 11: ((Q–>((~P–>P)–>P))–>((~P–>P)–>P))

- (P–>(((~P–>P)–>P)–>((Q–>P)–>P)))) [sub. P/ ((~P–>P)–>P) in L10]
- (((~P–>P)–>P)–>(((~P–>((~P–>P)–>P))–>((~P–>P)–>P))–>((Q–>((~P–>P)–>P))–> ((~P–>P)–>P))))
- (((~P–>((~P–>P)–>P))–>((~P–>P)–>P))–>((Q–>((~P–>P)–>P))–> ((~P–>P)–>P)))) [(2)/(Axiom 2)MP]
- ((~P–>P)–>P) [sub. P/ ((~P–>P)–>P) in Axiom 2]
- (((~P–>((~P–>P)–>P))–>((~P–>P)–>P)))
- ((Q–>((~P–>P)–>P))–>((~P–>P)–>P)) [(2)/(4) MP] Q.E.D.

Lemma 12: (T–>((~P–>P)–>P))

- (((~P–>Q)–>R)–>(P–>R)) [sub. P/T, Q/ ((~P–>P)–>P), R/ ((~P–>P)–>P) in L9]
- (((~T–>((~P–>P)–>P))–>((~P–>P)–>P))–>(T–>((~P–>P)–>P)))
- ((Q–>((~P–>P)–>P))–>((~P–>P)–>P)) [sub. Q/~T in L11]
- ((~T–>((~P–>P)–>P))–>((~P–>P)–>P))
- (T–>((~P–>P)–>P)) [(2)/(4) MP] Q.E.D.

Lemma 13: (~P–>Q)–>(T–>((Q–>P)–>P))

- (T–>((P–>R)–>S))–>((P–>Q)–>(T–>((Q–>R)–>S))) [sub. P/~P, R/P, S/P in L7]
- (T–>((~P–>P)–>P))–>((~P–>Q)–>(T–>((Q–>P)–>P)))
- ((~P–>Q)–>(T–>((Q–>P)–>P))) [(2)/(L12) MP] Q.E.D.

Lemma 14: (((T–>((Q–>P)–>P))–>R)–>((~P–>Q)–>R))

- (P–>Q)–>((Q–>R)–>(P–>R)) [sub. P/(~P–>Q), Q/(T–>((Q–>P)–>P)) in Axiom 1]
- ((~P–>Q)–>(T–>((Q–>P)–>P)))–>(((T–>((Q–>P)–>P))–>R)–>((~P–>Q)–>R))
- (((T–>((Q–>P)–>P))–>R)–>((~P–>Q)–>R)) [(2)/(L13) MP] Q.E.D.

Lemma 15: ((~P–>Q)–>((Q–>P)–>P))

- (((T–>((Q–>P)–>P))–>R)–>((~P–>Q)–>R)) [sub. T/ ~((Q–>P)–>P), R/((Q–>P)–>P) in L14]
- (((~((Q–>P)–>P)–>((Q–>P)–>P))–>((Q–>P)–>P))–>((~P–>Q)–>((Q–>P)–>P)))
- ((~P–>P)–>P) [sub. P/((Q–>P)–>P) in Axiom 2]
- ((~((Q–>P)–>P)–>((Q–>P)–>P))–>((Q–>P)–>P))
- ((~P–>Q)–>((Q–>P)–>P)) [(2)/(4) MP] Q.E.D.

Lemma 17: (P–>((Q–>P)–>P))

- (((~P–>Q)–>R)–>(P–>R)) [sub. R/((Q–>P)–>P) in L9]
- (((~P–>Q)–> ((Q–>P)–>P))–>(P–>((Q–>P)–>P)))
- (P–>((Q–>P)–>P)) [(2)/(L15) MP] Q.E.D.

Lemma 18: (Q–>(P–>Q))

- ((P–>(Q–>R))–>((S–>Q)–>(P–>(S–>R)))) [P/Q, Q/ (~P–>Q), R/Q, S/P in L5]
- ((Q–>((~P–>Q)–>Q))–>((P–>(~P–>Q))–>(Q–>(P–>Q))))
- (P–>((Q–>P)–>P)) [sub. P/Q, Q/~P in L17]
- (Q–>((~P–>Q)–>Q))
- ((P–>(~P–>Q))–>(Q–>(P–>Q))) [(2)/(4) MP]
- (Q–>(P–>Q)) [(5)/(Axiom 3) MP] Q.E.D.

Lemma 19: ((P–>Q)–>R)–>(Q–>R)

- (P–>Q)–>((Q–>R)–>(P–>R)) [sub. P/Q, Q/(P–>Q) in Axiom 1]
- (Q–>(P–>Q))–>(((P–>Q)–>R)–>(Q–>R))
- (((P–>Q)–>R)–>(Q–>R)) [(2)/(L18) MP] Q.E.D.

Modus Ponens: (P–>((P–>Q)–>Q))

- ((P–>Q)–>R)–>(Q–>R) [sub. P/~Q, Q/P, R/((P–>Q)–>Q) in L19]
- ((~Q–>P)–> ((P–>Q)–>Q))–>(P–>((P–>Q)–>Q))
- ((~P–>Q)–>((Q–>P)–>P)) [sub. P/Q, Q/P in L15]
- ((~Q–>P)–>((P–>Q)–>Q))
- (P–>((P–>Q)–>Q)) [(2)/(4) MP] Q.E.D.

Aristotelian Formal Deductive System has the condition that “empty names may not be the values of our name variables, i.e., such as “square circle”.” This is another way of stating that the subject must actually exist. This is known as Existential Assumption, which modern deductive systems in logic don’t hold to. So some of the theorems in this system aren’t acceptable in modern logic.

I have used polish notation, which was used by Lukasiewicz.

C= Conditional Implication (–>)

K= Conjunction (&)

N= Negation (~)

A= Universal Affirmative

E= Universal Negative

I= Particular Affirmative

O= Particular Negative

Axioms

S1: Aaa

All a are a

S2 Iaa

Some a are a

S3: CKAmbAamAab

If all m are b & all a are m then all a are b

S4: CKAmbImaIab

If all m are b & some m are a then some a are b

Definitions

D1: Oab=NAab

Some a are not b= Not all a are b

D2: Eab= NIab

No a are b= Not some a are b.

Postulates

T1: Cpp

p implies p

T2: CCpqCCqrCpr

If p implies q then if q implies r then p implies r

T3: CCpqCNqNp

If p implies q then not q implies not p

T4: CCpNqCqNp

If p implies not q then q implies not p

T5: CCNpqCNqp

If not p implies q then not q implies p

T6: CCKpqrCpCqr

If p & q implies r then if p then q implies r

T7: CCKpqrCqCpr

If p & q implies r then if q then p implies r

T8: CCKpqrCKpNrNq

If p & q implies r then p & not r implies not q

T9: CCKpqrCKNrqNp

If p & q implies r then not r & q implies not p

T10: CCKpqrCCspCKsqr

If p & q implies r then if s implies p then s & q implies r

T11: CCKpqrCCsqCKpsr

If p & q implies r then if s implies q then p & s implies r

T12: CCKpqrCCrsCKqps

If p & q implies r then if r implies s then q & p implies s

Theorems

Law of the Square of Opposition

S5 COabNAab

1. Cpp [sub p/NAab in T1]

2. CNAabNAab

3. COabNAab [by D1 of antecedent in 2]

Q.E.D.

S6 CNAabOab

1.Cpp [sub p/NAab in T1]

2. CNAabNAab

3. CNAabOab [D1 of consequent in 2]

Q.E.D.

S7 CAabNOab

1. CCpNqCqNp [sub. p/Oab, q/Aab in T4]

2. CCOabNAabCAabNOab

3. CAabNoab [by (2)/(S5) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S8 CNOabAab

1. CCNpqCNqp [sub. p/Aab, q/Oab in T5]

2. CCNAabOabCNOabAab

3. CNOabAab [by (2)/(S6) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S9 CEabNIab

1. Cpp [sub. p/NIab in T1]

2. CNIabNIab

3. CEabNIab [by D2 of antecedent in 2]

Q.E.D.

S10 CNIabEab

1. Cpp [sub. p/NIab in T1]

2. CNIabNIab

3. CNIabEab [by D2 of consequent in 2]

Q.E.D.

S11 CIabNEab

1. CCpNqCqNp [sub. p/Eab, q/Iab, in T4]

2. CCEabNIabCIabNEab

3. CIabNEab [by (2)/(S9) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S12 CNEabIab

1. CCNpqCNqp [sub. p/Iab, q/Eab in T5]

2. CCNIabEabCNEabIab

3. CNEabIab [by (2)/(S10) & MP]

Q.E.D.

Laws of Subalternation

S13 CAabIab

1. CCKpqrCqCpr [sub. p/Aab, q/Iaa, r/Iab in T7]

2. CCKAabIaaIabCIaaCAabIab

3. CKAmbImaIab [sub. m/a in S4]

4. CKAabIaaIab

5. CIaaCAabIab [by (2)/4) & MP]

6. CAabIab [by (5)/(S2) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S14 CNIabNAab

1. CCpqCNqNp [sub. p/Aab, q/Iab in T3]

2. CCAabIabCNIabNab

3. CNIabNAab [by (2)/(S13) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S15 CEabOab

1. CNIabNAab [reiteration of S14]

2. CEabNAab [by D2 of antecedent of 1]

3. CEabOab [by D1 of consequent of 2]

Q.E.D.

Laws of Contrariety

S16 CNOabNEab

1. CCpqCNqNp [sub. p/Eab, q/Oab, in T3]

2. CCEabOabCNOabNEab

3. CNOabNEab [by (2)/(S15) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S17 CEabNAab

1. CNIabNAab [reiteration S14]

2. CEabNAab [D2 of antecedent (1)]

Q.E.D.

S18 CAabNEab

1. CCpNqCqNp [sub. p/Eab, q/Aab in Th 4]

2. CCEabNAabCAabNEab

3. CAabNEab [by (2)/(S17) & MP]

Q.E.D.

Laws of Subcontrariety

S19 CNIabOab

1. CNIabNAab [reiteration S14]

2. CNIabOab [by (1) & D1 consequent]

Q.E.D.

S20 CNOabIab

1. CCNpqCNqp [sub. p/Iab, q/Oab, in Th 5]

2. CCNIabOabCNOabIab

3. CNOabIab [by (S19)/(2) & MP]

Q.E.D.

Laws of Conversion

S21 CIabIba

1. CCKpqrCpCqr [sub p/Aaa, q/Iab, r/Iba in Th 6]

2. CCKAaaIabIbaCAaaCIabIba

3. CKAmbImaIab [sub m/a, b/a, a/b in (S4)]

4. CKAaaIabIba

5. CAaaCIabIba [(2)/(4) & MP]

6. CIabIba [(S1)/(5) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S22 CAabIba

1. CCpqCqrCpr [sub p/Aab, q/Iab, r/Iba in Th 2]

2. CCAabIabCIabIbaCAabIba

3. CIabIbaCAabIba [by (2)/(S3) & MP]

4. CAabIba [by (3)/(S21) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S23 CNIabNIba

1. CCpqCNqNp [sub p/Iba, q/Iab, r/Iab in Th 3]

2. CCIbaIabCNIabNIba

3. CIabIba [sub a/b, b/a in (S21)]

4. CIbaIab

5. CNIabNIba [by (4)/(2) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S24 CEabNIba

1. CNIabNIba [reiteration (S23)]

2. CEabNIba [D2 of antecedent (1)]

Q.E.D.

S25 CEabEba

1. CEabNIba [reiteration (S24)]

2. Eba=NIba [sub a/b, b/a in D2]

3. CEabEba [by (1)/(2) D2 consequent (1)]

Q.E.D.

Syllogisms Figure 1

S26 CKAmbAamIab (Barbari)

1. CCKpqrCCsqCKpsr [sub p/Amb, q/Ima, r/Iab, s/Aam in Th 11]

2. CCKambImaIabCCAamImaCKAmbAamIab

3. CCAamImaCKAmbAamIab [by (2)/(S4) & MP]

4. CAamIma [sub b/m in (S22)]

5. CKAmbAamIab [by (3)/(4) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S27 CKAmbNIabNIma

1. CCKpqrCKpNrNq [sub p/Amb, q/Ima, r/Iab in Th 8]

2. CCKAmbImaIabCKAmbNIabNIma

3. CKAmbNIabNIma [by (2)/(S4) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S28 CKAmbEbaNIma

1. CCKpqrCCsqCKpsr [sub p/Amb, q/NIab, r/NIab, s/Eba in Th 11]

2. CCKAambNIabNImaCCEbaNIabCKAmbEbaNIma

3. CCEbaNIabCKAmbEbaNIam [by (2)/(S27) & MP]

4. CEabNIba [sub a/b, b/a in (S24)]

5. CEbaNIab

6. CKAmbEbaNIam [by (3)/(5) & MP]

Q.E.D

S29 CKEmbAamEab (Celarent)

1. CCKpqrCCrsCKqps [sub p/Aam, q/Emb, r/NIab, s/Eab in Th 12]

2. CCKAamEmbNIabCCNIabEabCKEmbAamEab

3. CKAmbEbaNIma [sub m/a, b/m, a/b in (S28)]

4. CKamEmbNIab

5. CCNIabEabCKEmbAamEab [by (3)/(4) & MP]

6. CKEmbAamEab [by (5)/(S10) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S30 CKEmbAamOab (Celaront)

1. CCpqCCqrCpr [sub p/KEmbAam, q/Eab, r/Oab in Th 2]

2. CCKEmbAamEabCCEabOabCKEmbAamOab

3. CCEabOabCKEmbAamOab [by (2)/(S29) & MP]

4. CKEmbAamOab [by (3)/(S15) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S31 CKEmbIamIab (Darii)

1. CCKpqrCCsqCKpsr [sub p/Amb, q/Ima, r/Iab, s/Iam in Th 11]

2. CCKAmbImaIabCCIamImaCKAmbIamIab

3. CCIamIMaCKAmbIamIab [by (2)/(S4) & MP]

4. CIabIba [reiteration (S21) & sub m/b]

5. CIamIma

6. CKAmbIamIab [by (3)/(5) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S32 CKNIabImaNAmb

1. CCKpqrCKNrqNp [sub p/Amb, q/Ima, r/Iab, in Th 9]

2. CCKAmbImaIabCKNIabImaNAmb

3. CKNIabImaNAmb pby (2)/(S4) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S33 CKEmbIamOab (Ferio)

1. CKNIabImaNAmb [sub a/m, m/a in (S32)]

2. CKNImbIamNAab

3. Emb=NImb [D2 sub a/m]

4. CKEmbIamNAab

5. CKEmbIam Oab [by (4) & D1 on consequent of (4)]

Q.E.D.

Syllogism Figure 2

S34 CKEbmAamEab (Cesare)

1. CCKpqrCCspCKsqr [sub p/Emb, q/Aam, r/Eab, s/Ebm in Th 10]

2. CCKEmbAamEabCCEbmEmbCKEbmAamEab

3. CCEbmEmbCKEbmAamEab [(2)/(S29) & MP]

4. CEabEba [sub a/b, b/m in (S24)]

5. CEbmEmb

6. CKEbmAamEab [by (5)/(3) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S35 CKEbmAamOab

1. CCpqCCqrCpr [sub p/KEbmAam, q/Eab, r/Oab in Th 2]

2. CCKEbmAamEabCCEabOabCKEbmAamOab

3. CCEabOabCKEbmAamOab [(2)/(S34) & MP]

4. CKEbmAamOab [by (3)/(S15) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S36 CKAbmEamEab (Camestres)

1. CCKpqrCCrsCKqps [sub p/Eam, q/Abm, r/Eba, S/Eab in Th 12]

2. CCKEamAbmEbaCCEbaEabCKAbmEamEab

3. CKEbmAamEab [sub b/a, a/b in (S34)]

4. CKEamAbmEba

5. CCEbaEabCKAbmEamEab [by (2)/(4) & MP]

6. CEabEba [sub a/b, b/a in (S25)]

7. CEbaEab

8. CKAbmEamEab [by (5)/(7) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S37 CKAbmEamOab (Camestrop)

1. CCpqCCqrCpr [sub p/KAbmEam, q/Eab, r/Oab in Th 2]

2. CCKAbmEamEabCCEabOabCKAbmEamOab

3. CCEabOabCKAbmEamOab [by (2)/(S36) & MP]

4. CKAbmEamOab [by (3)/(S15) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S38 CKEbmIamOab (Festino)

1. CCKpqrCCspCKsqr [sub p/Emb, q/Iam, r/Oab, s/Ebm in Th 10]

2. CCKEmbIamOabCCEbmEmbCKEbmIamOab

3. CCEbmEmbCKEbmIamOab [by (2)/(S33) & MP]

4. CEabEba [sub a/b, b/m by (S25)]

5. CEbmEmb

6. CKEbmIamOab [by (3)/(5) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S39 CKAmbNAabNAam

1. CKpqrCKpNrNq [sub p/Amb, q/Aam, r/Aab in Th 8]

2. CCKAmbAamAabCKAmbNAabNAam

3. CKAmbNAabNAam [by (2)/(S3) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S40 CKAbmOamOab (Baroco)

1. CKAmbNAabNAam [sub m/b, b/m in (S39)]

2. CKAbmNAamNAab

3. Oab=NAab [sub b/m in D1]

4. Oam=NAam

5. CKAbmOamOab [D1 of consequent (2)]

Q.E.D.

Syllogism Figure 3

S41 CKAmbAmaIab (Darapti)

1. CCKpqrCCsqCKpsr [sub p/Amb, q/Ima, r/Iab, s/Ama in Th 11]

2. CCKAmbImaIabCCAmaImaCKAmbAmaIab

3. CCAmaImaCKAmbAmaIab [by (2)/(S4) & MP]

4. CAabIab [sub a/m, b/a in (S13)]

5. CAmaIma

6. CKAmbAmaIab [by (5)/(3) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S42 CKEmbAmaOab (Felapton)

1. CCKpqrCCsqCKpsr [sub p/Emb, q/Iam, r/Oab, s/Ama in Th 11]

2. CCKEmbIamOabCCAmaIamCKEmbAmaOab

3. CCAmaIamCKEmbAmaOab [by (2)/(S33) & MP]

4. CAabIba [sub a/m, b/a in (S22)]

5. CAmaIam

6. CKEmbAmaOab [by (5)/(3) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S43 CKImbAmaIab (Disamis)

1. CCKpqrCCrsCKqps [sub p/Ama, q/Imb, r/Iba, s/Iab in Th 12]

2. CCKAmaImbIbaCCIbaIabCKImbAmaIab

3. CKAmbImaIab [sub b/a, a/b in (S4)]

4. CKAmaImbIba

5. CCIbaIabCKImbAmaIab [by (4)/(2) & MP]

6. CIabIba [sub a/b, b/a in (S21)]

7. CIbaIab

8. CKImbAmaIab [by (5)/(7) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S44 CKNAabAamNAmb

1. CCKpqrCKNrqNp [sub p/Amb, q/Aam, r/Aab in Th 9]

2. CCKAmbAamAabCKNAabAamNAmb

3. CKNAabAamNAmb [by (2)/(S3) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S45 CKOmbAmaOab (Bocardo)

1. CKNabAamNAmb [sub a/m, m/a in (S44)]

2. CKNAmbAmaNAab

3. Oab=NAab [sub a/m in D1]

4. Omb=NAmb

5. CKOmbAmaNAab

6. CKOmbAmaOab [by D1 of consequent in (5)]

Q.E.D.

S46 CKEmbImaOab (Fersion)

1. CCKpqrCCsqCKpsr [sub p/Emb, q/Iam, r/Oab, s/Ima in Th 11]

2. CCKEmbIamOabCCImaIamCKEmbImaOab

3. CCImaIamCKEmbImaOab [by (2)/(S33) & MP]

4. CIabIba [sub a/m, b/a in (S21)]

5. CImaIam

6. CKEmbImaOab [by (5)/(3) & MP]

Q.E.D.

Syllogism Figure 4

S47 CKAbmAmaIab (Bamalip)

1. CCKpqrCCspCKsqr [sub p/Imb, q/Ama, r/Iab, s/Abm in Th 10]

2. CCKImbAmaIabCCAbmImbCKAbmAmaIab

3. CCAbmImbCKAbmAmaIab [by (2)/(S43) & MP]

4.CAabIba [sub a/b, b/a in (S22)]

5. CAbmImb

6. CKAbmAmaIab [by (5)/(3) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S48 CKAbmEmaEab (Calemes)

1. CCKpqrCCsqCKpsr [sub p/Abm, q/Eam, r/Eab, s/Ema in Th 11]

2. CCKAbmEamEabCCEmaEamCKAbmEmaEab

3. CCEmaEamCKAbmEmaEab [by (2)/(S36) & MP]

4. CEabEba [sub a/m, b/a in (S25)]

5. CEmaEam

6. CKAbmEmaEab [by (5)/(3) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S49 CKAbmEmaOab (Calemop)

1. CCpqCCqrCpr [sub p/KAbmEma, q/Eab, r/Oab in Th 2]

2. CCKAbmEmaEabCCEabOabCKAbmEmaOab

3. CCEabOabCKAbmEmaOab [by (2)/(S48) & MP]

4. CKAbmEmaOab [by (3)/(S15) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S50 CKIbmAmaIab (Diamtis)

1. CCKpqrCCspCKsqr [sub p/Imb, q/Ama, r/Iab, s/Ibm in Th 10]

2. CCKImbAmaIabCCIbmImbCKIbmAmaIab

3. CCIbmImbCKIbmAmaIab [by (2)/(S43) & MP]

4. CIabIba [sub a/b, b/m in (S21)]

5. CIbmImb

6. CKIbmAmaIab [by (3)/(5) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S51 CKEbmAmaOab

1. CCKpqrCCspCKsqr [sub p/Emb,q/Ama, r/Oab, s/Ebm]

2. CCKEmbAmaOabCCEbmEmbCKEbmAmaOab

3. CCEbmEmaCKEbmAmaOab [by (2)/(S46) & MP]

4. CEabEba [sub a/b, b/m in (S25)]

5. CEbmEmb

6. CKEbmAmaOab [by (5)/(3) & MP]

Q.E.D.

S52 CKEbmImaOab (Fression)

1. CCKpqrCCspCKsqr [sub p/Emb, q/Ima, r/Oab, s/Ebm in Th 10]

2. CCKEmbImaOabCCEbmEmbCKEbmImaOab

3. CCEbmEmbCKEbmImaOab [by (2)/(S46) & MP]

4. CEabEba [sub a/b, b/m in (S25)]

5. CEbmEmb

6. CKEbmImaOab [by (5)/(3) & MP]

Q.E.D.

Read more at http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/d/democritus.html#Ti0otIFKyo1RksRu.99

I would rather discover one true cause than gain the kingdom of Persia.

Read more at http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/d/democritus.html#Ti0otIFKyo1RksRu.99“I would rather discover one true cause than gain the kingdom of Persia1. There exists at least one (empirical) principle that is true at describing an invariable relationship of the empirical world. (expressed) 2. There exists at least one possible (empirical) principle that is true at describing an invariable relationship of the empirical world. (expressed or not express3. There exists at least one invariable relationship of the empirical world.

Read more at http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/d/democritus.html#Ti0otIFKyo1RksRu.99“I would rather discover one true cause than gain the kingdom of Persia1. There exists at least one (empirical) principle that is true at describing an invariable relationship of the empirical world. (expressed) 2. There exists at least one possible (empirical) principle that is true at describing an invariable relationship of the empirical world. (expressed or not express3. There exists at least one invariable relationship of the empirical world.

“I would rather discover one true cause than gain the kingdom of Persia.” Democritus

Question: “Does there exist one true cause?”

The answer to this question, is answered in the affirmative by some and answered in the negative by some.

Affirmative: There does exist at least one causal relationship between events.

Negative: There doesn’t exist at least one causal relationship between events.

Both answers to the question are logically possible. There is no self-contradiction in either proposition. So it is possible that there does exist at least one causal relationship between events & it is possible that there doesn’t exist at least one causal relationship between events.

Suppose that we have someone similar to Democritus, they would be searching for at least one true causal relationship. It is possible that they don’t find what they are searching for since it is possible that there doesn’t exist at least one causal relationship between events.

So we can have the Aim of Searching for Universal Laws, but that doesn’t mean that what we search for is true or that we will find what we search for. In both cases we would neither be able to find what we search for (since it doesn’t exist) nor search for what is true (since it isn’t true).

We can have a methodological principle that there does exist at least one causal relationship between events. All our actions would be consistent with this methodological principle, but none of this is asserting that there actually does exist at least one causal relationship between events because it is possible that there doesn’t actually exist at least one causal relationship. This implies that our assertion was false, which implies that we didn’t find at least one true causal relationship.

The whole endeavor would be predicated on a fiction, and everything produced within the endeavor would be fictional as well. Even the single processes, or plural processes, used in this endeavor would only have input of fictions and output of fictions. It would be similar to comic books, having fictional characters as input in their process and fictions as the output in their process.

Suppose that there actually does exist a causal relationship between events. It is logically possible that both there exists at least one causal relationship between events & we don’t know this one causal relationship between events. However, it is logically impossible that we know both there exists at least one causal relationship between events & we don’t know this one causal relationship between events.

Suppose we know that both there exists at least one causal relationship between events & we don’t know this one causal relationship between events. It follows that, we know there exists at least one causal relationship between events and we know we don’t know this one causal relationship between events. We know there exists at least one causal relationship between events & we don’t know this one causal relationship between events. This is a contradiction, so it is necessary we don’t know both there exists at least one causal relationship between events & we don’t know this one causal relationship between events. From all this it follows we don’t know there exists at least one causal relationship. Since we don’t know there exists at least one causal relationship, it means that we can’t know that there exists at least one causal relationship.

The very Aim of the Search for Universal Laws would be of something that you can’t possibly know, even if you did obtain what you were searching for.

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“That’s the perspective of a new book by science journalist titled *Five Billion Years of Solitude, *a nod to the Gabriel García Márquez masterpiece *One Hundred Years of Solitude*. Billings constructs a moving tale of our collective yearning to find companionship in the vastness of space, using interviews with a few of the key players in the search for intelligent life..If we are alone, or if life is rare, we must be the protectors of life and take charge to preserve it at all costs, possibly spreading it to other planetary platforms.”

Suppose there is some strong desire that there exists at least one other mind & it is possible that there exists at least one other mind.

This would ignore that there is a strong desire that there does exist at least one other mind & it isn’t possible that there does exist at least one other mind. It would also ignore that if there is at least another mind then there aren’t a finite amount of other mind. So it would assume that there are a finite amount of other minds.

An individual mind has a strong desire that another mind exists as well. This other mind would have at least one, or more, similarities to the individual mind. There tends to be an immediacy of other minds, when we accept at least one. The individual mind will have another mind, and this leads to a relationship between them. Similar to how we say that one person is closer to me relative to another person. This is the most primary relationship of immediacy of other minds.

Given that there are only two individuals minds that exist, then it doesn’t matter about a higher, or more complex, immediacy of other minds. Should another mind be added, now we obtain a more complex immediacy of other minds. A>B>C, or A>C>B, or B>A>C, or B>C>A, or C>A>B, or C>B>A. But there is always at least one other mind that has principle immediacy of other minds.

This type of addition of other minds can also of be of different types of minds. There different types would be those specific differences that would at least at least to between the principle of immediacy of other minds. This is because no two minds are alike. So there would be at least one difference. This in turn implies that there exists at least one difference between each mind that exists.

Take the example of a human being who is married to another human being. John and Jane are married, and John holds that only one other mind, which is Jane, exists & vice versa. The immediacy would be of John to Jane. This would also hold with different types of minds, like those of John and the mind of a cat like Tibbles. This would mean it would also hold with what are called aliens species.

Human beings like to believe that other individual human beings exist. They further project the existence of different types of minds that are non-human beings. Once it has been projected to the immediate environment, it is also projected out into outer space.

From the presumed number of stars, planets, galaxies, and necessary conditions for life, that at least one other mind not of terrestrial origin exists. This is even supposing that goes beyond our solar system or local neighborhood in the galaxy. Just from the abundance of things it is immediately thought that there exist other minds from this abundance.

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Φ and Ψ will be used as meta-variables, which may be replaced by propositions at any time.

Meta-Variable for proposition Φ:

Given that Φ=True then Φ=True.

Given that Φ=False then Φ=False.

Symbolic (~) and Polish (N): Not..

Given that Φ=True then NΦ=False or (~Φ=False).

Given that Φ=False then NΦ=True or (~Φ=True).

Symbolic(&) and Polish (K): Both…and…

Given that Φ=True and Ψ=True, then KΦΨ=True or (Φ&Ψ)=True.

Given that Φ=True and Ψ=False, then KΦΨ=False or (Φ&Ψ)=False.

Given that Φ=False and Ψ=True, then KΦΨ=False or (Φ&Ψ)=False.

Given that Φ=False and Ψ=False, then KΦΨ=False or (Φ&Ψ)=False.

Symbolic (↓) and Polish (X): Neither…nor…

Given that Φ=True and Ψ=True, then XΦΨ=False or (Φ↓Ψ)=False.

Given that Φ=True and Ψ=False, then XΦΨ=False or (Φ↓Ψ)=False.

Given that Φ=False and Ψ=True, then XΦΨ=False or (Φ↓Ψ)=False.

Given that Φ=False and Ψ=False, then XΦΨ=True or (Φ↓Ψ)=True.

Symbolic (<->) and Polish (E): …if and only if…

Given that Φ=True and Ψ=True, then EΦΨ=True or (Φ<->Ψ)=True.

Given that Φ=True and Ψ=False, then EΦΨ=False or (Φ<->Ψ)=False.

Given that Φ=False and Ψ=False, then EΦΨ=False or (Φ<->Ψ)=False.

Given that Φ=False and Ψ=False, then EΦΨ=True or (Φ<->Ψ)=True.

Symbolic (v) and Polish (A): Either…or…both

Given that Φ=True and Ψ=True, then AΦΨ=True or (ΦvΨ)=True.

Given that Φ=True and Ψ=False, then AΦΨ=True or (ΦvΨ)=True.

Given that Φ=False and Ψ=True, then AΦΨ=True or (ΦvΨ)=True.

Given that Φ=False and Ψ=False, then AΦΨ=False or (ΦvΨ)=False.

Symbolic (↑) and Polish (D): Not both…and…

Given that Φ=True and Ψ=True, then DΦΨor (Φ↑Ψ)=False.

Given that Φ=True and Ψ=False, then DΦΨ or (Φ↑Ψ)=True.

Given that Φ=False and Ψ=True, then DΦΨ or (Φ↑Ψ)=True.

Given that Φ=False and Ψ=False, then DΦΨ or (Φ↑Ψ)=True.

Symbolic (->) and Polish (C): If…then…

Given that Φ=True and Ψ=True, then CΦΨ or (Φ->Ψ)=True.

Given that Φ=True and Ψ=False, then CΦΨ or (Φ->Ψ)=False.

Given that Φ=False and Ψ=True, then CΦΨ or (Φ->Ψ)=True.

Given that Φ=False and Ψ=False, then CΦΨor (Φ->Ψ)=True.

Tautologies:

Symbolic (&) and Polish (K): Both…and…

~(Φ&~Φ)=NKΦNΦ

~(~Φ&Φ)=NKNΦΦ

Symbolic (↓) and Polish (X):Neither…nor…

~(~Φ↓Φ)=NXNΦΦ

~(Φ↓~Φ)=NXΦNΦ

Symbolic (<->) and Polish (E):…if and only if…

(Φ<->Φ)=EΦΦ

(~Φ<->~Φ)=ENΦNΦ

Symbolic (v) and Polish (A):Either…or…both

(Φv~Φ)=AΦNΦ

(~ΦvΦ)=ANΦΦ

Symbolic (↑) and Polish (D):Not both…and…

(~Φ↑Φ)=DNΦΦ

(Φ↑~Φ)=DΦNΦ

Symbolic (->) and Polish (C): If…then…

(Φ->Φ)=CΦΦ

(~Φ->~Φ)=CNΦNΦ

Equivalence:

The order of these equivalence follow those above: (&), (↓), (<->), (v), (->), (↑)

(K) (Φ&Ψ): (Φ&Ψ), (~Φ&~Ψ), ~(Φ&~Ψ)&~(~Φ&Ψ), ~(~Φ&~Ψ), ~(Φ&~Ψ), ~(Φ&Ψ)

(X) (Φ↓Ψ): (~Φ↓~Ψ), (Φ↓Ψ), ~((~Φ↓~Ψ)↓(Φ↓Ψ)), ~(Φ↓Ψ), ~(~Φ↓Ψ), ~(~Φ↓~Ψ)

(A) (ΦvΨ): ~(~Φv~Ψ), ~(ΦvΨ), ~(Φv~Ψ)v~(ΦvΨ), (ΦvΨ), (~ΦvΨ), (~Φv~Ψ)

(D) (Φ↑Ψ): ~(Φ↑Ψ), ~(~Φ↑~Ψ), ~(Φ↑Ψ)↑(Ψ↑~Φ), (~Φ↑~Ψ), (Φ↑~Ψ), (Φ↑Ψ)

(C) (Φ->Ψ): ~(Φ->~Ψ), ~(~Φ->Ψ), ~((Φ->Ψ)->~(Ψ->Φ)), (~Φ->Ψ), (Φ->Ψ), (Φ->~Ψ)

]]>It will be assumed that each source of knowledge has three possible truth values to be attached to it. The truth values are always true, sometimes true, and never true.

From these two assumptions we are able to derive different epistemological systems that can take on any of these sources or truth values.

1. For all sources of knowledge, if knowledge source is Cognition then knowledge source is always true & if knowledge source is Senses then knowledge source is always true.

2. For all sources of knowledge, if knowledge source is Cognition then knowledge source is always true & if knowledge source is Senses then knowledge source is sometimes true.

3. For all sources of knowledge, if knowledge source is Cognition then knowledge source is always true & if knowledge source is Senses then knowledge source is never true.

4. For all sources of knowledge, if knowledge source is Cognition then knowledge source is sometimes true & if knowledge source is Senses then knowledge source is always true.

5. For all sources of knowledge, if knowledge source is Cognition then knowledge source is sometimes true & if knowledge source is Senses then knowledge source is sometimes true.

6. For all sources of knowledge, if knowledge source is Cognition then knowledge source is sometimes true & if knowledge source is Senses then knowledge source is never true.

7. For all sources of knowledge, if knowledge source is Cognition then knowledge source is never true & if knowledge source is Senses then knowledge source is always true.

8. For all sources of knowledge, if knowledge source is Cognition then knowledge source is never true & if knowledge source is Senses then knowledge source is sometimes true.

9. For all sources of knowledge, if knowledge source is Cognition then knowledge source is never true & if knowledge source is Senses then knowledge source is never true.

It should be made immediately clear that (2) and (4), and (3) and (7), and (6) and (8), are the converse of one another.

It should be made immediately clear that (1) and (9) are contrary to one another, since both may be false but both can’t be true.

It should be made clear that (1) and (5), and (5) and (9) are both contradictory, since both can’t be false but one can be true. Either (1) or (5) or (9) are true.

Those epistemological hypothesis, like those of (2)-(8), all are fallible. They are sometimes true. It can be supposed that there are different degrees contained within those epistemological hypothesis.

For example, it may be supposed that since some truth comes one of the two sources and that 99% is true or that 1% is true from one of the two sources.

Here is an example of fallibility, i.e. sometimes true, and different degrees of truth contained within it. Suppose that X stands for Cognition or Senses but not both together.

For all knowledge, if knowledge source is X then knowledge source is 99% true

For all knowledge, if knowledge source is X then knowledge source is 89% true

For all knowledge, if knowledge source is X then knowledge source is 79% true

For all knowledge, if knowledge source is X then knowledge source is 69% true

For all knowledge, if knowledge source is X then knowledge source is 59% true

For all knowledge, If knowledge source is X then knowledge source is 49% true

For all knowledge, if knowledge source is X then knowledge source is 39% true

For all knowledge, if knowledge source is X then knowledge source is 29% true

For all knowledge, if knowledge source is X then knowledge source is 19% true

For all knowledge, if knowledge source is X then knowledge source is 9% true

For all knowledge, if knowledge source is X then knowledge source is 1% true.

Categorical proposition: All X are Y.

Conditional proposition: If X then Y.

In other words, it is sometimes held that, All X are Y if and only if X implies Y.

This can be shown false by a very simple method that Categorical propositions aren’t equivalent to Conditional propositions. All we have to do is replace the variables X or Y with Truth Values, and see what the Truth of the proposition as a whole will come out to.

Suppose that X is True and Y is True. Now we replace those variables with their Truth Values in the Statements.

Categorical Proposition: All True are True= True.

Conditional Proposition: If True then True= True.

Suppose that X is False and Y is False.

Categorical Proposition: All False are False=True.

Conditional Proposition: If False then False=True.

Suppose that X is True and Y is False.

Categorical Proposition: All True are False= False.

Conditional Proposition: If True then False= False.

Here is where the Fallacy comes in of thinking Categorical Propositions are equivalent to Conditional Propositions.Suppose that X is False and Y is True.

Categorical Proposition: All False are True= False.

Conditional Proposition: If False then True=True.

We immediately notice that their truth value’s are not equivalent when each variable has the same truth value. This shows that categorical propositions necessarily say something different from conditional propositions.

The only way that Categorical Propositions will say the same thing as Conditional Propositions is if the Subject of the Categorical Proposition isn’t False & the Predicate isn’t True. In other words, the Subject of the Categorical Proposition must Exist.

All Mermaids are creatures that swim in the Ocean if and only if Mermaids implies creatures swim in the Ocean. Mermaids can’t not exist for this equivalency to hold with the Conditional, while the Conditional doesn’t need that Mermaids exist.

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