Truth suffers from too much analysis

Construction of the External World Pt. 3

Posted by allzermalmer on May 14, 2011

Here is the 3rd blog of the 6 part blog on the construction of the external world. You can read the last blog on the construction of the external world here.

Construction Three: That the presentations of a mind may continue in existence unperceived by that mind, provided that some other mind perceived them.

In the second construction, we noticed that there was agreement on presentations, and we also noticed there were differences in presentations. This third construction is based on those differences and try to build a consistent world view that there is only one universe.

Now let us suppose that John has a black book presented before him for one second, the book is removed for one second, and the books is returned before him for one second. This is a total of three seconds. Now suppose that Jane, throughout those three seconds, observed the black book all that time or that it was continuously visible to her for those three seconds. Now our question might be how does John and Jane deal with this matter? How doe John and Jane, when comparing notes on their presentations, take into account what happened?

Now was we already showed with the solitary mind, like that of John, the esse of the black patch called the book is identical with its percipi. The first construction implied the idea of an unperceived existence. This was not explicit in any case, to presentations, yet it was to relations between John and Jane. Thus, John only thinks the black patch exists only when it is being percieved. Thus, with the experiment mentioned above, John will think that the black patch came into existence at the first second, went out of existence with the second, and came back into existence with the third second. However, Jane will give a different account of things, since the black patch was presented to her for a total of three seconds, while John only had it present for two seconds. Thus, when John and Jane compare notes, they will notice that there is a difference between an account of their presentations.

Now John and Jane have decided that their two worlds are one world, based on the second mental construction. They have decided to accept the agreement and ignore the disagreement. However, these differences cannot be ignored, and so they must be dealt with. Since we found that each mind is its own universe, and each mind runs a parallel course to other minds, we have to deal with this dilemma. Now the minds must either give up the view of one single universe or accept that there are multiple universes. So in order to deal with this difficulty, the mind invents a new construction, which is the third construction.

There would be no difficulty if John and Jane have not decided to create one universe that they both occupy. Thus, if John and did not say he occupied the same universe as Jane, the differences between from what John and Jane experienced would not matter, and can be ignored. However, since the second construction, they are supposed to be identical, and the differences are to be explained.

Now returning to our previous example of John and Jane seeing the black book present to them. It disappeared from one universe, John’s, and yet was present continuously with Jane’s universe, even when there was a gape in John’s universe. Now, because of the second construction, both universes are formed into one universe, and it is supposed to be the same black patch which John and Jane have been observing. Because of this, John will be lead to the conclusion that ‘Since the black patch which appeared to Jane is identical (2nd construction) with the one which appeared to me, and since ti was existing in Jane’s mind after it had disappeared from mine, it follows that my black patch went on existing in Jane’s mind when it was absent from mine.’ Thus, we can draw the conclusion that presentations of one mind may continue to exist unperceived by that mind, so long as they are perceived by some other mind, which forms the third construction.

The black patch that John saw at the first second is identical with the one that he saw in the third second, and that it continued on in the existence of Jane’s mind when he had missed one of the intervals. Now the belief of John about the first and second appearances of the black patch were two different patches is superseded with its own construction (I might have to make a new blog on this subject alone). Thus, the first presentation can be taken as different from the second, or they can be taking as the same. Thus, we are stuck with another alternative truth, and we can go either way with this. And it makes it choice based on convince.

Now John and Jane will admit that presentations may continue unperceived by it, but will insist that the presentations must be perceived by some other mind. Thus, esse is still percipi, even though that doctrine received strange twists, as we noticed before. Yet we are led to another strange paradox. The existence of Jane’s presentations consists in the fact that its presented to here, i.e. that she is aware of it. And to say it goes on existing while she is not aware of it like saying it has gone on existing after it has gone out of existence. However, John and Jane must swallow this paradox, or they will have to give up the common world that they are constructing.  They cannot have it both ways. And so they will try to keep their common world by swallowing this paradox. And the convenience of it is too great to give up. Thus, the presentations of Jane go out of existence when she is not aware of the, but they are still existing when John is aware of them. For else if this was not done, we would have to give up our companionship and live in a lonely universe in isolation. Thus, it is accepted that presentations go on existence so long as they exist in some one else’s mind.

We accepted the first two constructions because they simplified things. The third one is accepted not because it directly simplifies things, but because it is derived from the first two mental constructions. For once we have accepted a single universe, then we cannot hold that Jane’s black patch goes on existing in John’s mind even when she is not aware of it, without going into a contradiction of the second construction. So the first two constructions were based on simplicity and economy, while the third is based on consistency with the first two. This is like logic. For I cannot accept proposition X and Y together, if Y contradicts proposition X. For this would make me inconsistent, and would mean that I am contradicting myself.

Now, the third construction like the other two, cannot be proved. It is a pure assumption that we make. The computer that Jane sees now with the computer that John now sees, is identical with the one which Jane would see tomorrow when John is not there to perceive it. Now, there is no reason to accept this, except for consistency once the first two constructions are accepted, which asserted the identity of many private worlds. And thus it is an inference from that construction, and only descends upon us as a logical consequent.

Suppose Jane’s black patch during the first second  m, Jane’s black patch during the first second n, and Jane’s black patch during the following second (which there is no black patch presented to John’s awareness) is n’. Thus, by second construction, m=n. And now by the third construction, n=n’ and so by deduction, m=n’. Thus, in another way of expression, John’s presentation during the first presentation is identified with Jane’s presentations during the second when no black patch was present to John’s awareness. This is the third construction.

The mind is free to accept the third construction, like it is like the first and second. There is no difference to the facts whether a presentation continues over the two presentations  or two thousand. It is just as true to regard it as two presentations or two thousand. Since there are many ways to look at the facts, it constitutes many alternative truths. And each alternative truth is just a ‘point of view’ which the mind chooses to adopt. It adopts the point of view set out by the previous two constructions because it is the simplest and most convenient.

The third construction does not, like the first one, posit any new existence. The first construction held that there exists a relation of resemblance between the presentations of John and Jane, and this resemblance cannot be either perceived or inferred, since it is based on a logical impossibility. Thus, this was a new invention of existence by the mind. And it was only expressible in a hypothetical judgement. This does not appear in the third construction, since there is no new existence posited. All it does is identify two actually perceived presentations. This implies that it stands upon the first construction. It implies unperceived resemblance between presentations which are identified and the assertion of resemblance possess the characteristics of the first construction. As the third construction advances beyond the first, it does not posses them. It only possess characters similar to the second, which is us living in one universe, which is expressed in a categorical judgement. And this construction, the second, is neither perceived or inferred, but invented by the mind.


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